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Understanding and developing a framework for explaining why and 
how businesses form cartels is a difficult and challenging endeavor. 
When studying the optimal deterrence strategies for the antitrust 
authorities, Connor (2005) analyzed a firms'-decision-making process in 
forming a cartel or in joining an existing cartel by comparing the 
expected benefit of cartel formation E(B) to the expected costs related to 
it E(C). He indicated a cartel is formed as long as E(B)>E(C) inferred 
using traditional Net Present Value (NPV) tools. However, NPV 
methods rely primarily on measuring the future streams of benefits and 
costs without much regard for higher moments of the distribution. Thus, 
in the presence of uncertainty about future streams and litigation costs, 
NPV may miss important dimensions that shape the issue. The decision 
to form or join a cartel is, at least, partially irreversible because the firm 
or its involved managers are exposed to litigation even after the cartel 
might be dissolved in the future. And because market demand and future 
profits are uncertain, firms are careful about the timing of their cartel 
formation decision. In this paper, we rely on the aforementioned 
irreversibility of cartel joining and on uncertainty to extend the work by 
Connor (2005). Specifically, we apply a real-options approach to 
examine the optimal decision rules regarding the timing of cartel 
formation leading to policy tools useful for antitrust agencies.
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• Regarding the domestic cartel formation, cartel formation is never 
optimal for firms if the sunk costs are prohibitive or the lifespan of 
cartel is too short;
• The collusion threshold shows that firms would prefer waiting to 
form a cartel if there is a great uncertainty of market demand, a large 
expected long-term demand growth, a large number of firms, and a 
significant amount of irreversibility in the decision;
• Firms would shorten the waiting time in forming a cartel when 
collusive profit is high, the expected duration of cartel is long, and 
the discount rate is large;
• The expected social welfare under uncertainty is less than that under 
certainty;
• Regarding the international cartel formation, collusion is most likely 
to occur between firms that come from countries with highly 
correlated markets, similar expected demand growth and market size.
Results
Figure 1.  Range of natural obstacle (K) and the expected cartel duration (λ) for 


































In the domestic model, n symmetric firms produce a homogenous
product and compete with each other in quantity in an infinitely
repeated game. The firms have an option to form a cartel and exercise
joint monopoly power on the market. The market demand is subject to
some stochastic shock at each period which follows a geometric
Brownian motion. The threshold demand is a function of several
parameters (in Table 1). Comparative dynamics analysis is conducted on
these parameters.
• Cartel formation or operation is never optimal if the discounted 
expected value of collusion is less than the sunk costs 
associated with cartel operation or if the lifespan of cartel is too 
short for the benefits from collusion to cover the sunk costs 
(Figure 1); 
• The cartel formation is more likely in economic boom periods;
• Cartel formation is delayed with higher sunk costs, a larger 
number of firms and more demand uncertainty, and it speeds 
up with longer cartel life and higher collusive profits;
• Cartel formation delays with a larger expected demand growth 
and speeds up with a higher discount rate (Figure 2);
• When there is a zero probability of cartel detection, the 
threshold level of demand associated with optimal timing of 
cartel formation under uncertainty exceeds the trigger demand 
level implied by the NPV method. And the difference between 
these two demand values increases with the market 
uncertainty;




Contact Xiaowei Cai                                    Kyle W. Stiegert
Department of Agribusiness                         Agricultural and Applied Economics
Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo 93405                University of Wisconsin, Madison 53706
Office: 805-756-5011                                   608-263-4176
Email:  cai@calpoly.edu kwstiegert@wisc.edu
• The expected time without considering firms' alternative options does not 
change much with the expected demand growth in country 1 (µ1). But, the 
expected time of optimal cartel formation considering the alternative 
options is first decreasing and then increasing with µ1;
• Firms have the most incentive to form an international cartel if the 
correlation (ρ) between the two markets is close to 1;
• Both the expected time of optimal cartel formation is decreasing with the 
market size of country 1 (η1) with or without the alternative options. 
When the two markets have about the same size, the incentive to form a 
cartel is the highest. 
Parameters Definition
α Expected Demand Growth
r Interest Rate
λ Expected Cartel Duration
n Number of Firms 
a Coefficient in the Demand Function
b Coefficient in the Demand Function
K Natural Obstacle
Table 1. Parameters Used in the Domestic Model Simulation
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Figure 3. Expected times of optimal international cartel formation as a function of one 
country’s demand growth, the correlation coefficient of the two markets and one 
country’s market size . (Note: Dashed line represents the expected time without 
considering the alternative options and solid line represents the expected time 
considering the alternative options.)
Figure 2. Threshold demand as a function of expected demand growth (α) and interest 
rate (r).   
In the international model, two symmetric firms producing homogenous
products in country 1 and country 2 separately. Before the two firms enter
each other's market, there is no international trade, firms face different
demand fluctuations in their own countries. If they decide to enter each
other's market, they both operate in the international market facing the
same uncertainty. The domestic shocks follow geometric Brownian
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